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Abstract
This paper analyses the relation between parents’ earnings and their children’s educa-
tion. In a context of perfect altruism, the model describes parents’ decisions on how much 
to consume and how much to invest in their children’s education. The model predicts that 
returns on education in terms of wages should be linear. Using this model in a competi-
tive economy, we show how the outcome depends on government subsidies or taxes on 
education. The usual tradeoff equality-efficiency arises in this context. Finally, the model 
provides some insights into the relation between education and productivity. 
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1. Introduction
Broadly speaking, the principal economic decision that a person takes during his or 
her life is how much to consume and how much to leave on bequest. Once we establish 
our expectations of our lifetime wealth,we decide our lifetime consumption, and the 
rest is left to the next generation.
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) report the high importance of the bequest motive in 
the wealth accumulation of individuals. The literature has proposed various explana-
tions for voluntary bequests. For instance, Bernheim et al. (1986) model the possibil-
ity of strategic bequests, with individuals conditioning bequests to the decisions of 
the beneficiaries. The other main rationale behind the bequests is that parents receive 
utility not only from their own consumption, but from bequeathing wealth to their chil-
dren. Laitner and Juster (1996) provide empirical evidence in this direction. Our model 
adopts this second approach.
This article centers on an important form of bequest: investing in one’s children’s 
human capital. The importance of human capital in modern economies is well known, 
and a huge share of production is devoted to its formation. As an example, Kendrick 
(1976) estimates that 1969 over a half of the total capital stock in United States was 
human capital1. A great part of this human capital investment is not provided or decided 
by individuals themselves, but by their parents or relatives. The fact that expenditure 
on one’s own schooling is not decided individually but by one’s parents is particularly 
clear in primary and secondary school.
Although we focus on this particular form of bequest, most of the results presented 
are also valid for more general kinds of intergenerational transfers. Human capital is 
usually related to education, but the decision of how much human capital to provide for 
one’s children is closely related tomany other important investments. The opportunity 
cost of rearing children is high in general, because of the forgone earnings both of 
parents and the children while attending school. Moreover, many other expenditures 
are linked to the decision to have children. For example, Durlauf (1996) models the 
importance of choosing asuitable neighborhood for the quality of the education and the 
future income of the children. All these related expenditures make investment in the 
children’s human capital one of the largest that parents make during their lives.
1 For other seminal papers of empirical analysis in this area, look at Barro (1991) and Mankiw 
et al. (1992).
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Poorer parents have more restrictive budget constraints on deciding how to share 
their wealth between their own consumption and their children’s human capital than 
parents that are richer. So human capital investment is likely to be correlated with the 
wealth of the parents. Becker and Tomes (1979) and Loury (1981) introduce models 
relating parental income to their children’s human capital. The diffculty of borrowing 
to invest in children’s human capital increases this correlation, even more especially 
because the returns on the human capital are earned by the children, and not by the 
parents.
We present a perfect altruism model where education is not paid for by the recipi-
ents themselves, but by their parents. In this model we assume that the wage of a job 
is related to the education required to be eligible fort his job. Parents, taking their own 
education as given, decide their own consumption and the investment in the education 
of their children. So, parents face a trade off when deciding how to share their earnings. 
On the one hand they want to increase their own consumption. On the other, they want 
to increase their children’s utility, which we will see, can be achieved by investing in 
their human capital.
Imposing stability in the job market, the model predicts that returns on education 
should be linear, at least for the first years of schooling, we use this result in a classic 
macroeconomic model to explore how it can affect the effciency of the production 
process. Introducing government taxes and subsidies, the model suggests an optimal 
policy for improving the outcome of the economy. This policy is subject to the classic 
tradeoff between effciency and equality. Finally, the model stresses a possible channel 
for explaining the correlation between wages and education.
After this introduction, Section II presents the benchmark model. Section III analy-
ses the results of using the benchmark model in a competitive economy where the 
production factors are different types of labor. The benchmark model is generalized in 
Section IV to a more realistic model, an economy with a continuum of possible educa-
tional investments and wages. Section V concludes.
2. A simple model: only two wages
In this first section we develop a simple model of parents choosing their children’s 
education. We assume that there is intergenerational altruism, that is, parents’ utility 
depends positively on their own consumption but also on their children’s utility. We 
consider bequests as simple transfers to increase their children’s utility and, eventually, 
their own. We assume that every parent has inelastically exactly only one child.
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Let’s consider an economy with only two kinds of jobs,which receive two differ-
ent wages. We assume that these two kinds of job require different skills, which can 
be acquired through education. For the sake of simplicity we assume that there are 
two types of workers, low-skilled and high-skilled. Their type depends exclusively on 
the education investment they received from their parents. We denote the educational 
investments required to be a low-skilled worker or a high-skilled worker by xL and xH 
respectively2. We assume that xH  > xL. We assume that the low-skilled jobs pay a wage 
equal to wL, and high-skilled jobs wH. We denote w(xL) ≡ wL and w(xH) ≡ wH.
In our model the wage is the only constraint parameter that may be different across 
individuals. Two parents with same wage have identical choices and receive the same 
utility from each of them. Thus, because they solve the same maximization problem, 
the utility can be written as a function of the wage, u(w). Parents take as given their 
own education level, and therefore their wage; they only decide the level of education 
that they will invest in their children. We assume the following general form for the 
utility:
 u(wp)= max { f [wp – xp, u(w(xp))] } , (2.1)
 xp∈{xL,xH}
where wp is the parents’ wage and xp is their investment in their children’s education. 
Parents decide considering their consumption, which is given by the net wage wp – xp, 
and the utility of the children u(w(xp)), since w(xp) is the wage earned by them. Then, 
the maximization problem (2.1) defines the utility function in terms of the wage and 
the utility function itself. It turns out to be a general type of Bellman equation, which 
allows us to endogenously determine the utility function u. Unfortunately, the equation 
(2.1) cannot be solved analytically for a general function f.
We assume that the function f has positive but decreasing marginal returns in both 
arguments. We consider a general form for this function, and in particular it could not 
be separable into two additive parts. This is in line with the utility functions proposed 
by Epstein and Zin (1991) for the utility regarding the decision between consumption 
and leisure. We also assume that education is a normal good. This assumption comes 
from the evidence provided by Charles and Hurst (2003) of the positive correlation 
between parent’s investments in their children’s human capital and their wealth.
2 Throughout this paper, the wage, the consumption and the capital investment refer to lifeti-
me values. We can interpret them simply as their present values.
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The variations in the portions of skilled and unskilled workers in our economy de-
pend on the decisions of individuals regarding the education of their children. Provided 
that every parent has only one child, number of workers of each type can change from 
generation to generation only if there are parents who provide a level of education to 
their children that is different from their own. The assumption that education is a nor-
mal good ensures that low-skilled parents will not invest more in the education of their 
children than high-skilled parents. Then, shares will only remain constant when each 
worker chooses to provide her children with the same educational investment as the 
one she received. In this case, instead of the usual golden rule, parents follow the wise 
folk saying «Pay your children the debts you owe to your parents.»
The steady state, in which shares remain constant, is only attainable when the job 
with the higher required amount of investment in education provides a higher wage, 
wH > wL. Otherwise, the choice of providing alow level of education for their children 
is strictly preferred by all the parents, because it provides more disposable income and 
high utility. This positive relation between level of education and income has long been 
documented, especially since the seminal work of Mincer (1958).Then, the steady state 
implies the following two conditions:
 u(wL) = f (wL – xL, u(wL)) ≥ f (wL – xH, u(wH))  and  (2.2)  
 u(wH) = f (wH – xH, u(wH)) ≥ f (wH – xL, u(wL)) .  (2.3)  
Note that these two equations are the same except for the swapping of subindexes. 
Considering only the equality relations, we see that wi appears either as the variable of 
the utility function, u(wi), or in the net wage wi – xi. This implies that in equilibrium 
u(wi)can be written as function of the net wage.
Let’s now consider a particular form for the function f(·,·) in order to obtain analyti-
cal results and interpret them. We assume a Cobb-Douglas utility, with the following 
form for the parents’ utility
 u(wp)= max { C.(wp – xp)b. [u(w(xp))]a } , (2.4)
 xp∈{xL,xH}
where 0 < a < 1, 0 < b < 1 and C > 0 are constants. When the economy is in the steady 
state the system (2.2) – (2.3) can be easily solved. The resulting utility function is the 
following:
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 1 1 — —
 u(wi) = C
1–a . (wi – xi)
1–a , i = H, L . (2.5)
We see that, as we previously noted, the utility can indeed be written as a function 
of the net wage. Were cover one of the oft-used functions of the utility of consumption, 
the isoelastic utility function. Using these results we can rewrite the steady state condi-
tions (2.2) and (2.3). Arranging these formulae we have
 (wL – xL) ≥ (wH – xH)
a · (wL – xH)
1–a and  (2.6)  
 (wH – xH) ≥ (wL – xL)
a · (wH – xL)
1–a . (2.7)  
These relations are displayed in Figure 1. In this figure we make the assumption 
that xL = 0 and xH = x > 0. This assumption can be made without losing generality due 
to the particular form of the restrictions (2.6) and (2.7). In these restrictions we can 
define x = xH – xL, wL = wL – xL and wH = wH – xL. Then, considering xL > 0 only shifts 
the graph, without changing neither the shape of the functions nor the conclusions we 
can extract from them.
Figure 1.—This figure shows the pairs (wH, wL) that lead the economy to the steady state when 
xH = x > 0 and xL = 0 (shadowed area)
L→H
(2.6)
H→L
(2.7)
x
x/α wHx
wL
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Figure 1 shows that the space of wages is divided into three parts, determined by 
thetwo steady state conditions (2.6) and (2.7). The set of points between these two 
curves and the wH axis comprises the steady states of the economy (shaded area). For 
the states in the upper set, above the (2.7) curve, the wage of the low-skilled workers is 
suffciently high to induce the high-skilled parents to invest little in their children edu-
cation (H → L).The states on the right side ofthe(2.6) curve are states where the high-
skilled workers wage is high enough to provide incentives to the low-skilled workers to 
make high investments in their children’s education (L → H).
Let’s calculate the steady state conditions at the limit when wH and wL are much 
higher than the price of a high quality education, x. In this case, the steady state condi-
tions converge to the following condition:
 
x
 wH = wL + — . (2.8)
 
a
The convergence to this straight line can be observed easily in Figure 1. In fact, 
when the education cost is suffciently low relative to the wages, the returns of the edu-
cation measured as increase of wages divided by the cost of education are a–1 > 1.
This model, in which parents take full consideration at the utility of their children, 
is included in the «perfect altruism» models. The great majority of macroeconomic 
dynamic models assume intergenerational transfers of resources between members 
of the same family. The most paradigmatic example of this kind of model is the Ram-
sey (1928) model, interpreted by Barro (1974) as infinite dynasties. In this model 
individuals have preferences regarding the utility of the whole dynasty, not only re-
garding their consumption through their lives. Although the Diamond (1965) model 
does not include the bequest motive for saving, bequests have also been included in 
overlapping generation models such as Burbidge (1983). Likesome of these models, 
our model exhibits an intertemporal ineffciency. In fact, parents apply an «selfish» 
discount factor to their children’s utility, which in our case is given by a. The lower 
the value of a, thelowerthe sensitivity of the parents’ utility to their children’s utility, 
and the higher the rewards have to be for parents who invest in their children educa-
tion. This factor, together with labor market stability considerations, determines the 
returns on education.
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3. Productive process
Until now we have assumed that wages are given exogenously. We now endogenize 
wages, introducing a productive process and a market economy. We assume that high-
educated workers and low-educated workers are now production factors pro-ducing 
ahomogeneousgood. In a competitive market economy, all the workers will be paid 
their marginal productions.
Most of the macroeconomic literature on human capital as a production factor fo-
cuses on models in which it enters the production function at an aggregate level, re-
gardless of its distribution among workers. Implicitly, it is assumed that the elasticity 
of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is infinite, that is, that they are 
perfect substitutes. Nevertheless, many empirical surveys, like those of Hamermesh 
(1993) or Katzand Autor (1999), report values of this elasticity between 1 and 2, cer-
tainly lower than infinite. So, it may be worth analyzing the implications of our model 
when the production function has imperfect substitutability between low-skilled and 
high-skilled labor.
Let’s consider an economy that produces a unique homogeneous good. This good 
is produced by using two production factors, high-educated labor and low-educated 
labor, and can either be consumed or invested in children’s education. All individuals 
are born unskilled and only if their parents pay the education cost, denoted by x, do 
they become skilled. All individuals live one period, and supply inelastically one unit 
of labor during this period. We denote the total number of low-educated workers in our 
economy by NL and the total number of high-educated workersby NH.
Although Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate a value for the elasticity of substi-
tution near to 1.4, we consider a Cobb-Douglas production function, with elasticity of 
substitution 1. This assumption, which leaves the elasticity in the range of reasonable 
elasticities [1,2], allows us to obtain analytical results that are also valid for other elas-
ticities. Then, the overall production is given by
Y = A · NL
c · NL
1–c ,
where A > 0 and c ∈ (0,1) are constants.
We consider that the economy is in a steady state, that is, that NH and NL remain 
constant. In this case we can define the net production as the total production minus 
the total cost of the education. The net production per capita can be expressed in the 
following way:
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 Yn Y – x·NH A·m
1–c – x·m
 yn = ———— = ————— = —————— , (3.1)
 NL + NH NL + NH 1 + m
where m ≡ NH / NL is the relative number of high educated workers with respect to 
low educated workers. Assuming a competitive economy where markets clear, every 
worker will earn his marginal production. So, the wages will be given by
 wL = A · c · m
1–c and wH = A · (1 – c) · m
1–c .
Let’s consider that individual shave a utility function equal to (2.4). For simplicity, 
we assume that the steady states of the economy verify equation (2.8). Then, we have 
the following relation between x and the number of workers in our economy
 
x
 — = wH – wL = A · (1 – c) · m
–c – A · c · m1–c . (3.2)
 
a
The right hand side of this equation is a strictly decreasing equation that ranges 
from ∞ to –∞ when m ∈ (0,∞). Then, given a price of education equal to x, we can ob-
tain the only relative ratio m that leaves the economy in the steady state. Unfortunately, 
for general values of the parameter c this equation cannot be solved analytically.
The net production is only maximized when the marginal production of a lowskilled 
worker, given by wL, equals the net marginal production of a high-skilled worker, given 
by wH – x. Then, the value of m obtained from (3.2) only maximizes the production per 
capita (3.1) when a =1. Subsequently, the market is unable to maximize the outcome of 
the economy for general values of  a. This is because there is an externality in our prob-
lem, given by the fact that investment in education is not decided by the recipients. In fact, 
because parents’ utility has a discount coeffcient on their children’s utility, given by a < 1, 
the education investment provided is lower than that desired by their children.
Through taxes and subsidies for education, the government can influence the de-
cisions of the agents, and try to improve the outcome of the economy. Consider an 
income tax,with constant tax rate x, that is used by the government to subsidize the 
education. We allow the possibility of x < 0, interpreting in this case x as the income 
subsidy rate using the government’s revenue from the taxation of the education. We de-
note the price paid by parents’ to provide education for their children by x. We denote 
the real cost of being a high educated worker by z.
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We assume that the government runs a balanced budget. Imposing then that the 
government inflows and outflows coincide, we have
 m A · m1–c
 (z – x)· ——— = x · ————. (3.3)
 1 + m 1 + m
The left hand side of this equation is the government subsidy/tax for education 
per capita. It is given by the difference between the real cost and the subsidized price 
multiplied by the portion of workers that receive education. The right hand side of this 
equation contains there venue/expenditure of the government per capita coming from 
the tax/subsidy on income. It is given by the tax rate multiplied by the average income 
of the economy. The model takes the real cost of education z as exogenously given. 
Then, equations (3.2) and( 3.3) establish a two-equations system with three unknowns. 
These unknowns are the subsidized price of education x, the tax rate x and the relative 
ratio of high educated workers with respect to low educated workers m. The solution of 
this system is the following:
 
a · m–c · (1 – c · (1 + m)) · (1 – mc · z)
 x(m)= ————————————————  and (3.4)
 1 – a
 · (1 – c · (1 + m))
 mc · z – a · (1 – c · (1 + m)) 
 x(m) = ————————————— . (3.5)
 1 – a
 · (1 – c · (1 + m))
Using m as the independent variable instead of x or x to determine the other vari-
ables may seem unnatural. In fact, this variable is in general endogenously derived 
from the endowments of the economy, their prices and the tax rates, and is not directly 
controllable by the government. Furthermore it is usually easy for the government to 
control the price of education and, in particular, the income tax rate. Unfortunately, the 
system can only be analytically solved expressing x(m) and x(m).
Now, utility depends on disposable income, that is, the income after taxes and subsi-
dies. Then, the net wage wi – xi in the utility (2.5) should be changed to include taxes and 
subsidies. For the low-skilled workers the net wage turns out to be wL
n = (1 – x) · wL – x, 
while for the high-skilled workers it is wH
n = (1 – x) · wH – x. These two net wages are 
important when we make welfare considerations about the outcome of the economy.
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In order to interpret the results, we obtain some interesting values for the vari-ables 
resulting from equations (3.4) and (3.5). We first inquire about what tax rate implies 
m = 0, that is, an economy where all workers arelow educated. Using (3.5) we obtain
 1
 x0 ≡ x(0) = – ——————
 1
 ———— – 1
 a · (1 – c)
Since 0 < a, c < 1 we have that x0 < 0, that is, the education is taxed. In fact, as x → 
x0 the price of education tends to infinity. Secondly we inquire about the income tax rates 
that make education free. Solving x(m) = 0 in (3.4) we find two solutions for m. The 
 1 – c
first solution is m = —— .This ratio maximizes the production per capita when the cost 
 c
of the education is 0, and implies the same wages for all the workers in the economy. 
 1 – c
The tax rate in this case is xx ≡ ( —— )
c
 · z. The second solution is given by m = z–c. 
 c
This solution implies x = 1, that is, all income is taxed. In this case, all wages after 
taxes are 0.
We use the tax rate x as the variable to display the different variables in Fig-
ure 2. This election is motivated by the fact that this variable is restricted to abounded 
interval, given by x ∈ [x0,1]. Moreover, this variable is directly controlled by the gov-
ernment. Note the variables displayed in this figure are net values.
Figure 2 shows that both the net production and the net wage of the low-skilled 
workers are 0 for x = x0 and x = 1. For x → x0, as we have seen, m → 0, and then the 
economy share of high-skilled workers tends to 0. Because the two production fac-
tors are essential for production, the net production per capita tends to 0. The relative 
abundance of low-skilled workers also depresses their net wages3. When x → 1 the 
whole wage is taxed, and then the net wage of all workers tends to 0. Since net wages 
tend to 0, nothing is left after spending on education, and so the net production is also 
3 As we can see in Figure 2 in this case the net wage of the low-skilled workers tends to 0. 
This occurs even though i tis subsidized (x0 < 0), due to an oversupply of low-skilled labor. A 
transfer from the rich (the only who pay the taxes of education) to the poor generates a huge in-
equality due to the high price of acquiring human capital.
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0 at this limit. So, it is easy to show that both the average net production and the low-
skilled workers’ net wage are hill shaped in the region x ∈ [x0,1]. We denote the tax 
rates that generate maxima in the net production and net low-skilled wages by xy and 
xL respectively.
Figure2.—Pictures of the net wages, average net production and cost of the education for 
different parameters, as functions of the tax rate
For x > xL the net wages of both high-skilled and low-skilled workers are de-creas-
ing functions of x. Because the utility (2.5) is an increasing function of the net wage, all 
individuals in the economy are better off when x = xL than when x > xL. Then, the region 
x > xL is clearly Pareto inefficient. Inside the region xx < x < 1 the education has a nega-
tive cost, x < 0. This region corresponds to a situation where people obtain money to 
be educated, but then high-skilled workers earn a lower net wage than the low-skilled 
workers. This situation seems unrealistic, especially since high-skilled workers can 
usually apply for low-skilled jobs, simply hiding their academic background. We can 
assume as well that taxes that increase the wage inequality are not politically feasible 
unless they increase the average net production. Then, the government can only choose 
an income tax rate inside the region x ∈ [xy, min{xx, xL}].
Inside the Pareto efficient and politically feasible region for the income tax rate 
there is a tradeoff between efficiency and equality. The income tax rate x = xy maxi-
mizes the net production of the economy, leaving the economy in a point of productive 
efficiency. Nevertheless, increasing x, the net wages of the two types of workers con-
verge, reducing the income inequality of the economy.
x
yn
wnLwnH
ττLτy τxτ0 1
x yn
wnL
wnH
ττy τL τxτ0 1
(a) (b)
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Note that a tax on income whose revenue is spent on subsidies in high education 
which only benefit the high income workers may seem a regressive fiscal policy. In-
deed, from a static perspective, the low-skilled workers arem worse off because their 
disposable income decreases, meanwhile those who are high-skilled are better off, 
since the reduction in the price of education is higher than the decrease in their income 
due to the taxes. Nevertheless, as we have seen, it may be a progressive fiscal policy 
from the dynamic point of view. In fact, once the economy reaches its new equilibrium, 
the low-skilled worker sare better of, sincethey are fewer and their net wages are higher 
than before due to their relative scarcity.
The literature on human capital, pioneered by Becker (1962) and Schultz (1963), 
has generally related the high wages of the highly educated to an increase in pro-
ductivity due to their human capital. Alternatively, Spence (1973, 1979) modeled the 
possibility that education may only be a signal for ex ante high-skilled workers. Our 
model obtains this relationship through a different channel. Parents only invest in their 
children’s human capital if this investment is rewarded with a high wage. The relative 
scarcity of high-skilled workers should be such that it allows them to earn a wage that 
compensates the human capital investment. In fact, if education is in expensive, arbi-
trage between the two types of jobs will equal their wages, independently of the skills 
required to apply fort his job.
This is particularly important when there is no perfect elasticity of substitution be-
tween the two types of jobs, as is suggested by the empirical data. In this case the mean-
ing of more productive worker is not well defined but it depends on the relative scarcity 
of the two types. In fact, in this case the individual’s marginal productivity depends on the 
actual endowments of the economy. Then, it is not education that directly makes a worker 
more productive, but the scarcity generated by the cost of acquiring new skills.
4. Many wages
We now generalize the benchmark model of section2 and apply it to a more realis-
tic case allowing many different jobs with many different wages. We will modelit as a 
continuum of the possible levels of education that a person can achieve.
Let’s assume that there is a wide range of jobs, each requiring a different level 
of skill, which depends on the education investment made by parents. Now parents’ 
investment in education, x, can take values in a wide range of non negative curves, 
X ⊂ R+. We assume that the wage earned by a worker with an investment in education 
x is given by the function w˜(x), that is, all the jobs that require the same investment in 
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education pay the same wage. Moreover, since worker with the same wage have identi-
cal maximization problems, the utility should depend only on the wage. In this case the 
utility will be given by
 u(w)= max f [w – x, u(w˜(x))] , (4.1)
 x∈X
with the usual conditions on the partial derivatives, f1 > 0, f2 > 0, f11 < 0 and f22 < 0. This 
maximization problem is identical to its analogous problem in the discrete case (2.1) 
changing the subset of possibl einvestments from discrete to continuous.
In general we have uʹ(w) > 0. As in the case of only two wages, this is because 
people with higher wages have strictly more utility than people with lower wages when 
they choose the same investment. In fact, when a parent with high wage invests the 
same quantity in their children’s education as a parent with lower wage, the children 
of both parents has the same utility, but the parent with high income consumes more. 
Then, because parents are utility maximizers, u(w) must be strictly increasing.
Let’s now look at the first order condition (FOC) that is obtained from the problem 
(4.1). In order to maximize their own utility, the corresponding FOC that they have to 
solve is given by
 – f1[w – x, u(w˜(x))]
 + f2[
 w – x, u(w˜(x))] · uʹ(w˜(x)) · w˜ʹ(x) = 0 . (4.2)
For any given functions u(·) and w˜f(·) this equation establishes a relationship be-
tween the quantity invested in the children’s education, x, and the wage earned, w, 
which we denote by x(w)4. As before we assume that education is a normal good, 
what ensures that parents with high wages invest a higher quantity in their children’s 
education than parents with low wages, and so xʹ(w) > 0. This is because when people 
earn more money they share the additional income between higher consumption (more 
disposable wage) and higher educational investment.
Let’s finally impose the condition that the economy is in a steady state, that is, par-
ents give their children the same education as the one they received. This means that, if 
parents earn a wage w, they invest an amount in their children’s x in order to make their 
children earn a wage w. The equation that expresses this condition is
4 We do not explicit dependence of x(w˜)on u and wfto simplify the notation.
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 w˜(x (w)) = w . (4.3)
This assumption is in line with the low intergenerational income mobility observed 
by Solon (1992). If we assume that the economy is inasteady state, we can replace w˜(x) 
by w in all the equations we have just presented. Using this and for a given f, the equa-
tion (4.2) gives us u(w).
In order to show how this model works and to obtain concrete results to interpret 
the equations we have found, we take a particular form for the function f. Consider that 
f has constant elasticity of substitution (CES) between its two arguments. Specifically, 
we assume that (4.1) takes the following form:
 1
 —
 u(w)= max C · [(1 – b) · (w – x)a + b · u(w˜(x) a)]a  .  (4.4)
 x
It is important to introduce the multiplying constant C because by definition the 
utility function depends on itself. In this kind of definition the cardinality of the utility 
function becomes important, and it is not just are scaling of the utility function. To 
avoid the possibility of infinite utility we assume Ca · (1 – b) < 1 and b · Ca < 1. In 
the steady state the utility can be directly obtained from equation (4.4). We obtain 
the following result
 (1 – b) · Ca 1
 u(w) = ( ————— )a · (w – x(w) .  (4.5) 
 1 – b · Ca
Note that utility depends linearly on the disposable wage w – x(w) through alinear 
function. Comparing this equation with the analogous in the (2.5) we may infer that the 
elasticity of the utility with respect to the net income depends on the global returns to 
scale of the function f. In fact, in this part of the paper we assumed a CES with constant 
returns to scale of f in order to be able to obtain analytical results. If we impose constant 
returns to scale in the function f considered in the f function of the initial model in (2.4), 
b = 1 – a, we recover exactly the same linear functional form for the utility.
Plugging (4.5) in to the FOC (4.2) we can obtainthe educational investment as a 
function of the parents’ wage, x(w). Doing so we obtain the following relationship
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 (1 – b).Ca
 1– b = b · ————— · (1 – xʹ(w)) · w˜ʹ(x) . (4.6)
 1 – b · Ca
Differentiating the equation (4.3) we know that xʹ(w) = 1/ w˜ʹ(x(w)). Using this in the 
previous equation it becomes an ordinary differential equation. Solving this equation, 
the returns on the educational investment required to achieve the steady state takes the 
following form:
 x
  w˜(x) = ——— + wb , (4.7)
 b · Ca
where wb is the integration constant. Note that this expression is very similar to (2.8)
obtained in the case of two possible education investments. In fact, as in the simplified 
model, there turns on education are linear in the steady state. In this case, the slope of 
this dependenceis (b · Ca)–1 > 1. Looking atthe utility function (4.4), this term could 
also be interpreted as the discount factor of parents with respect the utility of their 
children.
We can interpret wb as the minimum wage of our economy, that is, the wage of work-
ers that do not receive any educational investment from their parents. Note that in the 
continuous case returns on education are completely determined, while in the discrete 
case they were only constrained to be in a certain interval (see the shaded area in Figure 
1). This is because in this case parents can decide between a continuum of values of the 
investment and can adjust the investment at the margin, but in the discrete case, as they 
can only choose between two values, the range of possible disadjustments is wide.
This model predicts that returns on education, measured as the wage earned with re-
spect to educational investment, should be linear. Econometric studies, such as Patrinos 
and Psacharopoulos (2004), observe that returns on education are lower the later in life 
this education is received. These decreasing returns may be due to the fact that the older 
an individual is, the more he or she decides about his or her education,and the greater 
the share of this education that he or she has to finance. Then, it is plausible to assume 
that the slope of the returns on education (b · Ca)–1 (or a in the discrete model) progres-
sively tends to 1 when the years of education increase. This produces a reduction on the 
parents-children externality, and the premium for education diminishes.
Let’s now apply the condition of stability (4.3) to the result for the returns on edu-
cation (4.7) in order to quantify parent’s investment in their children’s education. This 
function is given by
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 x(w)= b · Ca · (w – wb) . (4.8)
The quantity invested depends linearly on the difference of the wage with respect 
to the minimum wage. Using this result we finally obtain the utility with respect the 
wage. This utility is given by
 (1 – b) · Ca 1
 u(w) = ( ————— )a · ((1 – b · Ca) · w + b · Ca · wb) .  (4.5)  1 – b · Ca
To shed light on the externality underlying these results we can consider the case 
when education investment is chosen by its recipients. Assume that the utility of an 
individual depends only on her net wage, so she maximizes u(w(x) – x) with respect to 
x. Then, the first order condition is given by wʹf (x) = 1. This result contrasts with our 
finding that wʹf (x) > 1. The reason is that parents discount the utility of their children, 
and then require higher returns to invest in education.
Conclusions
The model presented in this paper provides different insights into the mechanisms 
that interrelate parents’ earnings, children’s earnings and cost of education. Since many 
decisions and investments on human capital are mostly made by parents, intergenera-
tional altruism helps to explain the incentive sand the prices in the demand for educa-
tion and labor market.
The first result that the model provides is that education returns should be higher 
than those on other investments. The literature usually relates this fact to imperfections 
in financial markets (no collateral to allow borrowing) and moral hazard. In this model 
this differential is explained by the fact that parents apply a discount rate on the utility 
of their children. In fact, education can be considered an intergenerational investment, 
and therefore subject to an additional interpersonal discount rate.
Returns on education, measured as the relation between wages and education, are 
found to be linear. This linearity does not a rise from the increase in productivity caused 
by education, but is derived by imposing the stability of incomes throughout genera-
tion. Nevertheless, when education is decided at least in part by the recipients, the slope 
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of the curve may flatter, and the curve becomes concave. Then, decreasing returns may 
be observed when tertiary education is considered.
The fact that individuals do not decide their level of education may be considered 
an externality on the decisions of their parents. In trying to solve this externality the 
government can subsidize education by taxing income. From the static point of view 
this tax is regressive. In our model wealthy parents are the only that provide education 
for their children, and then the only who benefit from the subsidy. Nevertheless, from a 
dynamic point of view, a subsidy on education may increase the next wage of the low-
skilled workers in equilibrium by making them more scarce. In deciding on the optimal 
tax rate, the government faces the traditional tradeoff between efficiency and equality. 
The model predicts that for certain values of the parameters, a completely subsidized 
education system is not Pareto efficient.
Our model stresses the fact that high wages of high educated workers may not 
be linked to a gain in productivity. For general production functions, with imperfect 
substitutability between the different types of labor, the wage of a worker depends cru-
cially on the scarcity of his type. Then, in our model, high-skilled workers earn more 
not because they are more productive, but because they are scarce and have higher 
marginal returns. When the price of education is subsidized, the wages of high and low 
educated workers converge.
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